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An Analysis of U.S. Dairy Policy
Deregulation using an Imperfect
Competition Model
Nobuhiro Suzuki, Harry M. Kaiser, John E. Lenz, and
Olan D. Forker
An imperfect competition model of the U.S. milk market is developed for analyzing the
impacts of dairy policy deregulation. Estimated degree-of-competition parameters indicate that
the U.S. milk market has become more competitive over time. The usefulness of the model is
demonstrated by showing the relative differences of dynamic simulation results of the
imperfect competition model with the results of a conventional exogenous fluid differential
Since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) reached a successful agreement in De-
cember, 1993, it is useful for the U.S. dairy in-
dustry to be pro-active and consider the impact of
deregulation of the U.S. dairy industry. There are
three main federal programs that form the basis of
U.S. dairy policy and will be affected by trade
liberalization: the dairy price support program,
federal milk marketing orders, and import quotas.
There is also domestic pressures that bring the var-
ious programs into question, e,g,, regional con-
cerns over federal milk marketing orders, and bud-
getary pressure on the dairy price support program.
Most previous dairy policy models (e.g., Kai-
ser, Streeter, and Liu; Liu et al.) have assumed an
exogenous fluid differential because the dairy in-
dustry is regulated by federal milk marketing or-
ders which obligate milk handlers to pay the min-
imum Class I (fluid) differential. 1 However, the
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1Federal marketingorders also set the minimumClass 11andClass 111
prices. The M-W price has been used as the minimum Class 111 price for
most orders since 1960. The M-W price is an estimate of the average
fluid differential is actually not exogenous be-
cause, in addition to the premiums associated with
the federal minimum prices, there are over-order
payments resulting from negotiations2 between
dairy cooperatives and processors (or manufactur-
ers).3 Most previous models have not accounted
for over-order payments. An imperfect competi-
tion model with an endogenous fluid price differ-
ential is necessary for estimating how large the
fluid price differential might be without existing
regulations.
While imperfect competition models of the Jap-
anese milk market have been developed by Suzuki,
Lenz, and Forker; and Suzuki et al., there have
been no imperfect competition models developed
for the U.S. milk market.4 The purpose of this
paper is to present an imperfect competition model
with an endogenous fluid price differential to eval-
uate the market effects of deregulating the U.S.
dairy industry. The usefulness of the model is
demonstrated by comparing the results of dynamic
price paid for manufacturing grade (Grade B) milk by manufacturing
plants in Minnesota aad Wkconsin. Grade B milk is now a very small
portion of the national market (approximately 6%), atthough it is still
used to set M-W prices,
2The Capper-VolsteadAct accnrdscooperativesspecial treatment for
their collective bargaining,
3 Inthk paper, the term” processor” refers to processorof fluid milk,
while the term “manufacturer” refers to manufacturerof non-fluiddairy
products.
4 The American Agricultural Economics Association Task Force Re-
port stated in 1986that “since the 1930’s, agricultural economist have
emphasizedthat some modelbesides pure competitionis needed. But no
one has yet proposed such a model in a form capable of generating
comparative-staticresults concemins the effects of marketing orders as
compared to no orders.” (p, 34)Suzuki et al. Imperfect Competition Dairy Policy Model 85
simulations of this model with the results of a con-
ventional exogenous fluid differential model.
In this study we estimate the effective fluid price
(the M-W price + the minimum fluid price differ-
ential + any over-order payment) to measure the
degree of competition in the U.S. milk market, and
incorporate a degree-of-competition measure into
the U.S. dairy policy model. The degree-of-
competition measure based on the effective fluid
price differential (the minimum fluid price differ-
ential + any over-order payment) is considered an
aggregate indicator of the degree of imperfection
created by federal policies, and market power of
cooperatives and processors and manufacturers in
the U.S. milk market. While over-order payments
exist not only for Class I milk, but also for Class II
and III milk, over-order payments for Class 11and
III milk are all included in the fluid differential in
this analysis because of data limitation.
Theoretical Model
be located near farms because dairy products are
less bulky to ship than raw or fluid milk.
We do not consider such possibilities in the cur-
rent analysis because the number of deficit areas
and the magnitude of fluid differentials in a per-
fectly competitive market is difficult to predicts
Several previous studies, which tried to estimate
welfare losses caused by marketing orders, also
assumed no differentials as a benchmark for com-
parison (Buxton; Dahlgran; Ippolito and Masson;
Masson and Eisenstat).
If one specifies that, under imperfect competi-
tion, the role of dairy cooperatives is to allocate
their raw milk supply to fluid and manufacturing
markets so as to maximize total milk sales reve-
nues, the first order condition is to equate marginal
revenues from fluid and manufacturing milk.
When cooperatives undertake processing them-
selves, manufacturing costs should be taken into
account. For simplicity, our current model does
not incorporate these costs. Under perfect compe-
tition, the first order condition is expressed as:
(1) Pf = Pm
To measure the degree of imperfection, a perfectly
competitive market is defined as a basis of com- where Pf is fluid milk price, Pm is manufacturing
parison. One would expect a relatively uniform milk price.
manufacturing milk price nationwide. According At the opposite extreme, the first order condi-
to Robinson, tion for monopoly or collusion is:
“Class II or manufacturing milk prices are ap-
proximately the same in all markets and are
linked to the M-W price. Uniform pricing of
manufacturing milk is necessary because prod-
ucts derived from surplus milk are easily trans-
ported between regions. Cheese, butter, and
skim-milk powder produced in federal-order
markets must compete with similar products
manufactured from grade B milk in Minnesota
and Wisconsin. Handlers operating in federal-
order markets will not purchase surplus milk if it
is priced higher than what unregulated plants
pay for manufacturing milk in the Midwest. ”
(Robinson, p. 116)
Without cooperative market power and revenue
pooling, individual farmers would compete with
each other until the price difference between fluid
and manufacturing milk would disappear except
for modest locational differences. If a market did
not have enough milk to meet local fluid uses,
there would be some locational or transportation
differentials paid for fluid milk even without mar-
keting orders and cooperatives because fluid plants
would have to transport milk from further dis-
tances. Fluid plants tend to be located near popu-
lation centers, while manufacturing plants tend to
(2) Pf(l – l/Ef) = Pm(l – lkm)
where ~f = [(dQf/dPf) “(P#Qf)[ and ~~ = [(dQ~/
dP~) “ (Pm/Qm)lare price elasticities of fluid and
manufacturing milk demand in absolute value
terms; Qf is the aggregate quantity of fluid milk
demand; and Q~ is the aggregate quantity of man-
ufacturing milk demand.
To express an intermediate degree of imperfect
competition, a degree-of-competition parameter, (3
(Os 0 s 1), is introduced. Then, equality across
markets of “perceived” marginal revenue is ex-
pressed as:
(3) Pf(l – ef/Ef) = Pm(l – Ore/Em)
or
(4) Pf + 6f oQf/(dQf/Wf) = Pm + 6m
~Q~/(dQ#P~).
The parameter 6 is considered an aggregate indi-
cator of the degree of competition in the milk mar-
ket. Marginal milk production costs do not enter
5McOowelI, Fleming, and Spinelli looked at differentials that wouId
be obtained in dtiferent markets under a multiple base point pricing
system.86 April 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
equation (3) or (4) because milk production is al-
most never controlled by cooperatives, but rather it
is determined by individual farmers’ response to
blend prices they receive.
Although the degree of competition parameter is
specified by cooperatives’ revenue maximizing be-
havior, it is also affected by the countervailing
power of processors and manufacturers. There-
fore, it should be noted that the degree-of-
competition parameter reflects both cooperatives’
and processors’ and manufacturers’ market power.
We do not have a way to explicitly incorporate
processor’s and manufacturers’ oligopsonistic
power into the current model.
If 0 can be assumed to be the same for both fluid
and manufacturing markets, one can identify a
value of 0 which satisfies equation (3) or (4), with
values of milk price elasticities estimated by de-
mand functions and observations of Pf, Pm, Qf, and
Qm. However, (3mwill probably be lower than Of
because cooperatives face more competition in the
manufacturing milk market than in the fluid milk
market. Fluid milk products are costlier to trans-
port than manufactured milk products, and, there-
fore, the geographical scope of markets for man-
ufactured milk products in general will exceed that
for fluid milk products. Since there likely is more
competition in the manufactured product market
than in the fluid market, the manufacturing milk
market is probably more competitive.
Instead of deriving 6 with the assumption that $
= f3~by estimating both fluid and manufacturing
demand equations, one could estimate the fluid (or
manufacturing) demand equation and equation (3)
or (4) into which the manufacturing (or fluid) de-
mand equation is substituted. The parameter, 6, is
directly estimated as a coefficient of (3) or (4)
using this method (Bresnahan), and 6f and 8~ can
be separately identified. However, the coefficients
for the manufacturing (or fluid) demand equation
cannot be identified (See Appendix).
The solution to this problem adopted here is to
assume that 0~ = O and then solve for OF The
assumption that 6~ = O is plausible because the
manufacturing milk price for each market is given
as the M-W price, and the M-W price is indirectly
supported by government purchases of dairy prod-
ucts. We do not consider the fact that some orders
such as Chicago obtain significant over-order
Class III payments (Babb) in this analysis because
we have no national average data on over-order
payments for Class III milk. We use the assump-
tion (6~ = O) and identify a value of 6f which
satisfies (3) or (4), assuming that Ofis constant in
each time period and that cooperatives approxi-
mately realize the condition expressed by (3) or
(4). This means that (3) and (4) can be replaced
with:
(5) Pf(l - O+ef) = Pm
or
The full imperfect competition model is ex-
pressed as:
Milk production:
(7) Q = f(BP)
Fluid milk demand:
(8) Qf = M’f)
Manufacturing milk demand:
(9) Qm = Wrn)
Milk sales maximizing allocation:




(12) BP = (Pf ~Qf + Pm ~QJ/(Q – FUSE)
where Q is aggregate milk production, BP is the
blend price, and FUSE is on-farm use of milk pro-
duced (assumed to be exogenous), with all other
variables as previously defined. The other exoge-
nous variables (feed price, income, advertising ex-
penditures, and trend) are not included in the
above simplified expressions. With six endoge-
nous variables (Q, Qf, Q~, Pf, Pm, BP) and six
equations, the model is complete. Because this
model expresses farmers’ supply, and processors’
and manufacturers’ demand for raw milk, govern-
ment purchases of dairy products and changes in
commercial inventories are not treated separately,
i.e., manufacturing milk demand (Q~) includes
commercial manufacturing demand, government
purchases of dairy products, and changes in com-
mercial inventories on a milk-equivalent basis.
Empirical Model Estimation
Over-Order Payment Data
The effective fluid milk price is equal to the M-W
price plus the minimum Class I differential plus
6The dataandits sources are listed in Kaiser et al.Suzuki et al !mperject Compe~ition Daiq Policy Model 87
any over-order payments. Since the only available
data on over-order payments pertain to “an-
nounced” over-order payments in 35 markets by
the USDA, it is difficult to collect the over-order
payment data for all cooperatives over time and to
construct a national average. time-series data set.
Instead, the effective fluid milk price (F’f)is esti-
mated by solving the blend price equation for P;
(13) Pf = [BP c(Q – FUSE) – Pm “Q~)l/Qf
The difference between the Class II and III prices
is minor and neglected like most previous models.
However, since over-order payments exist not only
for Class I milk, but also for Class 11and III milk,
equation (13) assigns the over-order payments for
Class II and III milk to the fluid differential. Con-
sequently, the estimated effective fluid prices may
be higher than the actual ones because they include
all premiums over the M-W price. To check the
possible bias of using the estimates from equation
(13), the estimated prices are compared with sim-
ple annual average values of “announced” coop-
erative Class I prices in 35 markets reported by the
USDA. As shown in table 1, the estimated effec-
tive prices are larger than the cooperative prices in
many years as is expected, but the differences are
relatively small, and in some recent years the an-
nounced cooperative prices are slightly higher.
Table 1. Differences Between the Effective
Fluid Milk Prices Estimated by Equation (13)
and the “Announced” Cooperative Class I
Prkes Reported by the USDA
(Simple Annual Average)
Effective Fluid Milk (Class I) Price
“Announced”
Cooperative
Estimates by Prices in
Equation (13) 35 Markets Difference
































































This comparison implies that over-order premiums
for Class II and III milk are not large on average,
and, therefore, the effective fluid prices estimated
by equation (13) probably does not generate a se-
rious bias in estimating the degree-of-competition
parameter.
The blend price is the all milk price reported by
the USDA which includes over-order payments.
The differences between the estimated effective
fluid milk price and the minimum Class I price are
shown in Figure 1. The effective prices are higher
than the minimum prices in almost all years, indi-
cating the existence of over-order payments. Fig-
ure 1 implies that most previous models had inter-
nal data inconsistency because they used the min-
imum Class I price and the all milk price.
Supply Function
The aggregate milk supply (Q) is estimated using
quarterly data from 1975 through 1990 as a func-
tion of the current and lagged milk-feed price ratio
(MF = blend price/feed price), time trend
(TREND) representing technical progress, inter-
cept dummy variables for the Milk Diversion Pro-
gram (MDP) and the Dairy Termination Program
(lITP), and harmonic seasonality variables (SINI,
COS1, and COS2) (see table 3). The econometric
results are presented in table 2, along with all of
the estimated equations.
A polynomial distributed lag is imposed to ac-
count for lagged effects of the milk-feed price ra-
tio.7 Among many alternative forms, the second
degree polynomial distributed lag with both end-
points constrained to lie close to zero and a six
quarter lag provided the best results. This lag
length seems reasonable considering the biological
reproduction cycle of dairy cows.
The estimated long run price elasticity of milk
supply is 0.224, which is similar to Chavas and
Klemme’s estimated two-year price elasticity of
0,20, and Weersink’s estimate of 0.29. To over-
come significant first-order autocorrelation in the
disturbance term, the Cochrance-Orcutt procedure
is employed. Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) es-
timation was used because both milk production
and the blend price are endogenous variables in the
model.
7 Because longrun milk-feedpriceeffects are consideredby imposing
a polynomial distributed lag, the number of cows is not included as an












Figurel. Quarterly Effective and Minimum Class IPrices inthe U.S., l97&9O.
Fluid Milk Demand Function
The fluid milk demand function is the processors’
“derived” demand for raw milk.8 To insure that
all identities are meaningful, all quantities in the
model are measured on a milk-fat equivalent basis.
Per capita fluid milk demand (Q~N) is explained
by the effective fluid milk price (Pf), per capita
income (INC), the ratio of persons under 19 years
old to the total population (AU19), current and
lagged fluid advertising expenditures (branded
fluid advertising – BAf, and generic fluid adver-
tising – GAf), and harmonic seasonality variables
(SINI, COS1, and COS2). The variables Pf and
INC are deflated by the consumer price index, and
BAf and GAf are deflated by the media price
index.
A polynomial distributed lag is imposed to ac-
count for lagged generic fluid advertising effects.
The second degree polynomial distributed lag with
both endpoints constrained to lie close to zero and
a five quarter lag provided the best results. The
effects are largest four to six months later, and
erode in about a year. No lagged effects of branded
fluid advertising were found to be significant, but
the current effect was significant.
Calculated at mean data points, the estimated
elasticities of fluid demand with respect to price,
income, and branded fluid advertising are
– 0.293, 0.483, and 0,0089, respectively. Liu et
al.’s estimated elasticities of retail fluid demand
with respect to price and income were – 0.282 and
0.154, respectively. The estimated long run ge-
8It is assumed that changes in retail fluid and manufacturedproduct
prices correspond to changes in raw milk prices,
neric advertising elasticity is 0.054, which is sim-
ilar to Kinnucan and Forker’s estimate of 0.051 in
New York City, but larger than Liu et al,’s esti-
mate of 0.0175 for retail-level national fluid
demand.
The fluid demand function was estimated using
a linear form because other functional forms (dou-
ble-log, semi-log, log-inverse, and inverse) re-
sulted in negative marginal revenue estimates and
were rejected because negative fluid milk marginal
revenue precludes discussion of the collusion case
expressed by equation (2).9 TSLS was used to es-
timate this equation because both quantity and
price are endogenous in the model.
Manufacturing Milk Demand Function
Because this is the manufacturers’ “derived” de-
mand for raw milk, government purchases of dairy
products and changes in commercial inventories
are not treated separately. Per capita manufactur-
ing milk demand (Q~/N) was estimated as a func-
tion of the manufacturing milk price (PJ deflated
by the CPI, per capita income (lNC) deflated by
the CPZ, the ratio of persons under 19 years old to
the total population (AU19), current and lagged
manufacturing milk advertising expenditures
(branded manufactured product – BA~, and ge-
neric manufactured product – GAJ, intercept
dummy variables for the DTP and MDP, and har-
monic seasonality variables (SINI, COS1, and
COS2).
The DTP and MDP were included in this de-
9 The manufacturingdemand function is also estimated using a linear
form to be consistent with the fluid demand function.Suzuki et al. lmperject Competition Dairy Policy Model 89
Table 2. The Estimated Equations
Milk Supply (1975.2 - 90.4)
bz(Q) = 3.899 + 0.019 h@fF) + 0.032 [n(MF)_, + 0.040 b@fF)_2
(24.75Y (3.86) (3.86) (3.86)
+ 0.043 b@fF) _~ + 0.040 b@F).4 + 0.032 b@fF) _5
(3.86) (3.86) (3.86)
+ 0.019 h(MF).6 + 0.0039 TREND – 0.024 MDP – 0.041 DTP
(3.86) (8.17) (- 1.67) (-2.94)
—0.0053 SIN1 – 0.052 COSI + 0.0071 COS2 + 0.734 (UQ)_,
(– 1.94) (– 19.57) (5.40) (7.57)
Adj. R* = 0.95 D.W. = 1.79
F4uidDemand (1976.3 - 90.4)
Q#N = – 0,077 – 0.105 (P#CPl) + 0.0011 (lNC/CPl)
( - 2.49)( - 3.16) (2.70)
+ 1.0 x 10-7 (GAf) + 1.7 X 10-7 (GAf)_, + 2.0 X 10-7 (GAf)_2
(3.10) (3.10) (3.10)
+ 2.0 x 10-7 (GAf)_3 + 1.7 X 10-7 (GA,)_4 + 1.0 X 10-7 (GAy)_5
(3.10) (3.10) (3.10)
+ 6.8 X 10-7 (BAf) + 0.387 AU19 + 0.0016 SIN1 + 0.0023 COS1
(2.60) (4.85) (8.28) (10.15)
+ 0.00018 COS2 + 0.788 (@’~)_ ~
(3.70) (4.94)
Adj. R2 = 0,92 D.W. = 2.02
Manufacturing Demand (1976.3 – 90.4)
QJN = 0.378- 1.113 (PJCPI) -0.0069 (lNC/CPI)
(4.66) (- 3.96) (-3.55)
+ 3.6 X 10”7 (BAJ + 5.4 X 10-7 (BAJ, + 5.4 X 10-7 @AJ_2
(2.34) (2.34) (2.34)
+ 3.6 X 10-7 @AJ3 – 0.0059 DTP + 0.018 D89.4
(2.34) (–1.71) (2.80)
– 0.022 D90.4 – 0.0013 SIN1 – 0.0074 COSI + 0.00074 COS2
(–3.16) (–1.98) (- 9.08) (2.12)
+ 0.670 (uQm’~)_ ~
(3.78)
Adi. R’ = 0.78 D.W. = 1.74
*Figuresin parentheses are t-values.
mand function because this derived demand in-
cludes government purchases of dairy products as
well as commercial use. Since these two programs
significantly affected the government component
of manufacturer demand, they are included in this
equation. The federal dairy price support program
is considered in this equation in that the manufac-
turing milk price (P. = M-W price) is indirectly
supported through government purchases of dairy
products, Intercept dummy variables are also in-
cluded for the fourth quarters of 1989 and 1990
because regression residuals for both periods are
very large. The outlier for the fourth quarter of
1989 is likely due to the unusually strong demand
for nonfat dry milk during that quarter, but we
have no explanation for the fourth quarter 1990
outlier.10
A polynomial distributed lag is imposed to ac-
count for lagged branded manufacturing advertis-
10~ventog building by cheese wholesalers and manufam.mrs in be
face of uncertainties in milk supply could be another factor to explain
unprecedented increases in M-W prices.
ing effects. The second degree polynomial distrib-
uted lag with both endpoints constrained to lie
close to zero and a three quarter lag provided the
best results. We could not estimate any significant
effects of generic manufacturing advertising (a
negative coefficient with very small t-value is
found). The variable, AU19, and the intercept
dummy variable for the MDP were also not signif-
icant. Consequently, these variables were dropped
from the model. The estimated coefficient on the
income variable is negative and significant, which
is not consistent with expectations. Because each
dairy product has a very different demand trend
and structure, disaggregated estimation would
likely produce better results, however, this is be-
yond the scope of the present analysis.
Calculated at mean data points, the estimated
elasticities of manufacturing demand with respect
to price and long run branded advertising are
– 1.575 and 0.234, respectively. The estimated
price elasticity is relatively large compared to pre-
vious studies such as – 0.928 by Liu et al. Again,
TSLS was used to estimate this equation because90 April 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review





















milk production (billion pounds),
(blend price)/(feed price), where blend price is all milk price ($/cwt) and feed price is US. average price of
16% protein dairy feed ($/ton),
time trend variable equal to 1 for quarter 1, 1970, ,
intercept dummy variable for the Milk Diversion Program equal to 1 for quarter 1, 1984through quarter 2,
1985, 0 otherwise,
intercept dummy variable for the Dairy Termination Program equal to 1for quarter 2, 1986through quarter 3,
1987, 0 otherwise,
harmonic seasonality variables representing the first wave of the sine function (1, O, – 1, O),the first wave of
the cosine function (O, – 1, 0, 1), and the second wave of the cosine function (– 1, 1, – 1, 1), respectively,
(1, O, – 1, O)etc. are values for each quarter, where the i%stquarter means tr/2, second n, third 3m/2, and
fourth 2T,
lagged residual,
fluid milk marketed (billion pounds),
U.S. population (million persons),
effective Class I price estimated using equation (13) ($/cwt),
consumer price index for all items (1982–84 = 100),
disposable personal income per capita ($1,000),
generic and branded fluid advertising expendkures deflated by the media price index ($1,000), respectively,
ratio of persons under 19 years old to the total population (total = 1),
manufacturing milk marketed (billion pounds),
M-W price ($/cwt),
branded manufacturing advertising expenditures (including branded butter advertising, branded ice cream
advertising, and branded cheese advertising) deflated by the media price index ($1,000),
intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for quarter 4, 1989, 0 otherwise,
intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for quarter 4, 1990, 0 otherwise.
both manufacturing demand and price are endog-
enous in the model.
Degree-of-Competition Parameter
The degree-of-competition parameter is equal to
one under monopoly or collusion, and zero under
perfect competition or price-taking behavior. As
shown in table 4, derived annual average estimates
of f3f’susing equation (5) or (6) indicate that the
Table 4. Estimated Degree-of-Competition
Parameters (Annual Average)















‘Figures in parentheses are standard errors defined by: ((Pf –
PJ/CF’1)/(Q#T) , [standard error of the fluid demand func-
tion’s estimated slope].
U.S. milk market is neither perfectly competitive
nor purely monopolistic, The estimates imply
some degree of market imperfection that has been
declining over time.
Competitive pressures in the fluid market have
increased over time due to improvements in trans-
portation technology and increasing reserves of
milk in areas other than the Minnesota and Wis-
consin. Dairy farmers have tried to reduce the
competitive pressures by merging cooperatives and
milk marketing orders while size of manufacturing
plants have become larger. The gradually decreas-
ing degree-of-competition parameters could be the
consequences of a power balance caused by these
developments.
Simulations
To determine the validity of the estimated model
for analyses of deregulation, values for the endog-
enous variables, given the values for the exoge-
nous variables, were determined in a fully dynamic
simulation by the Gauss-Seidel techniquel 1for the
historical period 1980-90. As illustrated by the
11This is ~ “umeric~ technique used in the TSP-Micro eCOIrOrn@iC
software, It is similar to the Newton and the Fletcher-Powell methods,
but is more powerful in dealing with large models that have block com-
ponents,Suzuki et al.
Table 5. Mean Absolute Percent
Errors (1980.1-90.4)
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Imperject Competition Model
Endogenous Variables Mean Absolute Percent Error
%
Ffuid Milk Price (Pf) 3.10
Manufacturing Milk
Price (PJ 3.70
Blend Price (BP) 3.54
Fluid Milk Demand (Qf) 1.60
Manufacturing Milk
Demand (QJ 2.91
Milk Production (Q) 1.67
mean absolute percent errors12 shown in table 5,
the largest error is less than 4%, which is quite
reasonable for a dynamic simulation.
It is unclear how deregulation might be imple-
mented. Because our focal point is to examine the
relative differences between model results, we do
not consider any gradual deregulation following
some time schedule.
For simulating cases without import quotas
where the manufacturing milk market is open to
foreign imports, the manufacturing milk price (Pm)
in equation (10) is interpreted as a given imported
product price measured on a milk-fat equivalent
basis, It is assumed that farmers would consider
the demand for manufacturing milk to be perfectly
elastic at the import product (world) price. Be-
cause the model is a single-country model, we can-
not determine the import product price level after
elimination of import quotas endogenously by
solving a multi-country model such as the Minis-
terial Trade Mandate (MTM) model of the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), and USDA’s SWOPSIM (OECD;
Roningen). Because our focal point is to examine
the differences between two model results, we as-
sume a 20’%decline from the current Pm level for
each year as an example.
In addition, Q~ is replaced by Q~i (total man-
ufacturing milk demand including dairy imports in
milk equivalents) in (9), i,e.: -
(14) Q~i = M~m)
Also, the following definitional
ports is added:
identity for im-
(15) Q[ = QMi – Q.
where Q, is dairy imports on a milk-fat equivalent
basis.
12me fomula is (I/n)q(P – AYA1 x ]00, where P is the p~icted
vatue and A is the actual value.
The imperfect competition model for simulation in
the case where there are no price supports, no im-
port quotas, and no marketing orders is:
(16) Q = j_@V’)
(17) Q~ = W’J
(18) Q~i = M~m)
(19) P~+ f3~“Q~/(dQ#Pj = Pm
(20) Q = Qf + Q. + FUSE
(21) BP = (P~oQ~+ P. oQJ/(Q – FUSE)
(22) Q1~ Q~i – Q~
Exogenous Fluid Differential Model
The difference between the current imperfect com-
petition model and the conventional exogenous
fluid differential model is found in equation (19).
The imperfect competition model is transformed to
the exogenous fluid differential model used in
most previous analyses by replacing equation (19)
with:
(23) Pf = P. + DIFF
where DIFF is the exogenous fluid price differen-
tial. It should be noted that DIFF is not the mini-
mum Class I differential, but the effective fluid
differential treated as an exogenous variable.
Comparison of Simulation Results
We used historical time periods for our simulations
to avoid having to estimate the future values for
exogenous variables. The dynamic simulation re-
sults, from 1980 to 1990, are shown in table 6.
Comparison of the two models illustrates how
the imperfect competition model yields different
estimates of deregulation effects from the results of







Competition – 15.2 – 17.2 – 4.2
Model
Exogenous
Differential – 16.1 – 17.6 –4.3
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the conventional exogenous fluid differential
model.
The differences in results between the imperfect
competition and exogenous fluid differential mod-
els tend to be rather small. For instance, results of
the imperfect competition model show that, com-
pared to the current level, 13the fluid milk price
would be 15.2% lower on an average for the sim-
ulation period, the blend price would be 17.2%
lower, and milk production would be 4.2%
smaller. Results of the exogenous fluid differential
model show that the fluid milk price would be
16,1% lower on an average for the simulation pe-
riod, the blend price would be 17.6!Z0lower, and
milk production would be 4.390 smaller.
In the imperfect competition model, dP#aP~ is
expressed by
(24) ap~dpm = 1/(1 + 6f) = 0.946
where 0.946 is an average of simulation periods.
This means that fluid milk prices decline by 95%
of the magnitude of manufacturing price declines.
In the exogenous fluid differential model,
Therefore, the exogenous fluid differential model
tends to overestimate the negative effects of dereg-
ulation compared to the imperfect competition
model, but the differences are relatively small. As
equation (24) shows, the larger Ofis, the smaller
dP\aP~, In other words, more fluid market imper-
fection could cause less direct translation of de-
creases in the manufacturing price into decreases
in the fluid price.
Summary and Conclusions
The effective fluid price differential (the minimum
differential plus any over-order payment) is con-
sidered to reflect the degree of competition in the
U.S. milk market. An imperfect competition
model with the fluid price differential endoge-
nously explained by the degree of competitiveness
is theoretically preferred to the exogenous fluid
differential model because the fluid price differen-
tial is not exogenous due to over-order payments.
This paper presented the first imperfect compe-
tition model with an endogenous fluid differential
for the U.S. dairy market using degree-of-
competition parameter estimates, The estimated
parameters imply that there is some degree of im-
13 The ~mnt “~ue~ ~ not observations but values solwi by fuIIY
dynamic simulation of equations (7) to (12),
perfection in the U.S. milk market, which has been
declining over time. Competitive pressures in the
fluid market have increased over time due to im-
provements in transportation technology and in-
creasing reserves of milk in areas other than the
Minnesota and Wisconsin. Dairy farmers have
tried to reduce the competitive pressures by merg-
ing cooperatives and milk marketing orders while
size of manufacturing plants have become larger.
The gradually decreasing degree-of-competition
parameters could be the consequences of a balance
of power due to these developments.
The usefulness of the model was demonstrated
by showing the relative differences of dynamic
simulation results of the imperfect competition
model with the results of an exogenous fluid dif-
ferential model.
Because it is uncertain whether or not the cur-
rent degree of market competition would remain
unchanged after deregulation, we cannot deter-
mine that the imperfect competition model pro-
vides more likely estimates of key milk market
parameters after deregulation than the exogenous
fluid differential model. At a minimum, the exog-
enous fluid differential model tends to overesti-
mate the negative effects of deregulation compared
to the imperfect competition model, if the current
degree of competitiveness in the U,S. milk market
is maintained after deregulation. Decreases in the
manufacturing milk price exactly correspond to de-
creases in the fluid milk price in the exogenous
fluid differential model. However, some market
imperfection could cause less direct translation of
decreases in the manufacturing price into decreases
in the fluid price.
Our simulation results show that the effects of
deregulation are indeed larger with the exogenous
fluid price differential model than with the imper-
fect competition model, but the differences are rel-
atively small. This provides some justification for
using the exogenous fluid price differential model
as a simplifying, but acceptable alternative. There
is a trade-off between realism and tractability in
model building. If the losses associated with sim-
plifying assumptions are small, it is often benefi-
cial to make them and then concentrate on the pa-
rameters that impact the analysis most signifi-
cantly. Since the degree of competition parameter
has been declining in the U.S. dairy industry, re-
searchers may not be guilty of a capital offense by
treating the fluid differential as exogenous in some
cases.
The model presented in this paper is a basic
framework, and improvements in its shortcomings
would be valuable in future research. In particular,
processors’ and manufacturers’ market power isSuzuki et al, Imperfect Competition Dairy Policy Model 93
not explicitly incorporated into the current model,
and over-order payments for Class II and III milk
are aggregated in the effective fluid differential.
Also, cooperatives with manufacturing plants are
not considered, which is a characteristic of the




For simplicity, fluid and manufacturing demand
equations are specified as follows:
(Al) Q~=a+bP~
(A2) Q.=c+dP.
Then, equality across markets of “perceived”
marginal revenue is:
(A3) Pf + OfoQ$b = Pm + 6~ oQJd
In this paper, we attempted to estimate 6‘s from
(A3) using estimates of (Al) and (A2).
Alternatively, substituting (A2) into (A3) yields;
(A4) P~ = – 9~b oQ~ + (1 + 6JP~
+ 0~ . cld
If (Al) and (A4) are estimated without estimating
(A2), both 6f and 6m are identified, but c and d
cannot be identified separately.
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